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Abstract
Agricultural support levels are at a crossroad with reduced distortions in OECD countries and
increasing support for agricultural producers in emerging economies over the last decades. This
paper studies the determinants of distortions in the agricultural markets by putting a specific
focus on the role of trade policy. Applying various different dynamic panel data estimators and
explicitly accounting for potential endogeneity of trade policy agreements, we find that an increase
in the number of bilateral free trade agreements exhibits significant short- and long-run distortion
reducing effects. By contrast, WTO’s Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture has not been able to
systematically contribute to a reduction in agriculture trade distortions. From a policy point of
view our findings thus point to a lack of effectiveness of multilateral trade negotiations.
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1 Introduction
Studying the economic rationale for governmental interventions in markets and understanding its
outcomes constitute one of the main and long-lasting questions addressed in economics. Thereby,
researchers have put a specific emphasis on the food and agriculture sector which has been subjected
throughout history and all over the world to the most extensive and far-reaching political steering and
intervention attempts. From the historically most famous protectionism in Britain in the 19th century
- the Corn Laws - to the costly Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in the EU or the outstandingly high
export taxes in South America, there are numerous cases to study the causes and consequences of such
extensive market interventions. In recent economic research the question on the main determinants of
market interventions has been mainly studied in the field of political economy that has come a long way
from niche player to a suitable analysis tool for economic policy reforms. Thus for example the World
Bank conducted a yearlong research project on agricultural distortions with a key focus on political
economy analyses and triggered a new wave of publications surveyed in e.g., Anderson, Rausser, and
Swinnen (2013). This research project provides new and interesting findings on recent trends regarding
market distortions in agricultural markets, motivating further research especially in light of changing
international trade relationships due to multilateral and bilateral trade policy initiatives.
Over the last two decades a heated debate emerged on how to most effectively organize trade ne-
gotiations. After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreement and the founding of the WTO,
multilateral trade talks have become less successful and different proposals for further rounds of trade
liberalization have not made substantial progress, did not achieve unanimous assent from all members
and thus could not be approved. As a consequence, we observe a tremendous rise in the number of
signed bilateral (and plurilateral) trade agreements leading to the formation of regional trade blocs
(see, e.g., Bagwell, Bown, and Staiger 2016). From 1991 to 2010 to number of bilateral trade agree-
ments has been steadily rising from 51 to more than 400 (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). As a result,
trade negations are nowadays carried-out simultaneously at the multilateral as well as the bilateral
level and countries might use just one of both options in case they believe they will be more successful
by concentrating on a specific type of trade negotiations. In line with this development, a compre-
hensive analysis of the impact of trade policies on market distortions in agricultural markets needs
to simultaneously account for both multilateralism as well as bilateralism. While the impact of the
formation of the WTO (ignoring bilateral trade agreements) on agricultural markets has been already
studied in the literature (see, e.g., Swinnen, Olper, and Vandemoortele 2012), a simultaneous analysis
of WTO membership and bilateral trade negotiations is still missing.
With the shifting balance of the global economy in the last half decade in terms of dynamic GDP
growth in emerging countries and the formation of new regional trade blocks, the overall picture on
policy support granted to the agricultural sector has changed significantly. Numerous lower income
countries have switched from taxing agricultural production to applying protectionist measures, while
richer countries reduced their level of most distorting measures and shifted their policy support towards
decoupled payments to farmers (Swinnen et al. 2012). Based on previous experiences the rising support
levels in emerging markets and other fast growing lower income countries can be expected to have a
significant impact on international agricultural markets as their overall economic relevance is will
continue to grow.
Therefore it is of great interest to understand the impact of macroeconomic factors and other inter-
national trade issues on the development of agricultural support measures. In particular, the aim of
the paper is to empirically investigate the impact of trade negotiations on market distortions in (in-
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ternational) agricultural markets and to disentangle the respective contributions of multilateral versus
bilateral trade talks. This paper builds to a certain extent on Swinnen et al. (2012) in analyzing the
level of distortions but extends the analysis to different types of trade agreements and also utilizes an
updated and enlarged dataset, in which all necessary data are available for a time span capturing the
years from 1980 to 2011 and 76 countries. Accordingly, we apply a dynamic panel data framework
which allows to identify the ceteris paribus effects for both different types of trade agreements and
enables us to calculate both the short- and long-run effects of trade policy on market distortions in
agricultural markets. In order to account for the persistence in market distortions over time, World
Bank’s nominal assistance coefficient (discussed in detail in Anderson et al. 2013) is regressed on its
one year lagged value and on bunch of control variables identified as crucial determinants for market
distortions in the previous literature. On top of that, the specification accounts for a country’s WTO
membership as a measure for multilateral trade agreements together with its number of bilateral trade
agreements in force obtained from Dür et al. (2014). In the empirical analysis we consider different
dynamic panel data estimators also explicitly addressing the potential endogeneity of the number of
bilateral trade agreements signed.
In line with previous literature, our estimates indicate a non-linear relationship between market dis-
tortions and the average income level (measured in terms of GDP per capita). Accordingly, market
distortions are increasing with income but at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, countries which exhibit a
positive agricultural trade balance tend to shwo less positive or in some cases even negative price distor-
tions. Furthermore, agricultural market distortions are characterized by non-negligible persistence over
time. With regard to the variables of most interest, a country’s WTO membership does not systemat-
ically affect a country’s distortions in agricultural markets while an increase in the number of signed
bilateral trade agreements significantly reduces agricultural market distortions both in the short- and
long-run. In particular and based on the preferred econometric specification and estimator, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the number of bilateral agreements (i.e., 22.3 signed agreements) decreases
the nominal assistance coefficient by -0.089 and -0.309 in the short- and long-run, respectively. From
a policy point of view, our findings suggest that multilateral trade agreements as negotiated within
the WTO-framework lack effectiveness in terms of contributing to reducing distortions in international
agricultural markets. By contrast, bilateralism and the formation of regional trade blocs seem to be
more effective in reducing market distortions in agricultural markets.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the main political economy
arguments identified in the literature on market distortions in agricultural markets and describe the
main recent trends and developments in agricultural policies taking place all over the world. Section 3
provides and in depth discussion on the utilized data, the empirical specification applied and highlights
the most important econometric issues involved for the identification of short- and long-run effects of
trade policy for distortions in agricultural markets. In Section 4 we present our estimation results and
provide an extensive sensitivity analysis, while Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy
This section offers a discussion on the most recent trends and developments in agricultural markets
distortions and provides a brief overview on the existing empirical literature studying the main deter-
minants for market distortions. Furthermore, we also briefly present data on bilateral trade agreements
highlighting their increasing relevance for international trade policy making. This section thus motives
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our main research question and embeds the empirical framework proposed into the relevant literature.
2.1 Recent Trends and Developments in Agricultural Policy
In the history of agricultural economics and international trade one event is unanimously referred to
as a milestone in trade liberalization – the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 19th century. With the
end of the Napoleon wars in 1815, grain prices fell after the agriculturalists had enjoyed a period of
high prices during the war times. These generally lower prices in combination with superior yields in
France and the Netherlands compared to those in England led to new legislation in England to keep
out cheap corn. In contrast to the preceding corn laws, which existed for many decades, the 1815 corn
laws were "definitely protective" (Adams 2013; Schonhardt-Bailey 2006). The influential landowners
organized in the Conservative Party benefited from the protectionism and it took until 1846 that, after
strong opposition from a growing industrial middle class, the Corn Laws were repealed. Economic
historians see the repeal of the Corn Laws as a major boost for British free trade and, in consequence,
for the industrialization of Europe. The repeal of the Corn Laws represents without a doubt on of the
biggest shifts in agricultural support policies in history and remains a much debated topic for political
economists and agricultural economists alike. The history of the Corn Laws does, however, already
highlight two key aspects influencing agricultural price policies: The agricultural trade balance and
the overall economic development played an important role both for introducing and repealing the
protective measures.
Great Britain’s commitment to free trade - not only in agriculture - lasted longer than in most other
western regions and only with the economic depressions in the 1920s the country returned to import
duties (UK Parliament 2016). After the Second World War western countries returned to free trade
policies, most notably marked by the initiation of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). Accordingly, the second event that economists commonly refer to when it comes to
trade liberalization in agriculture is the GATT’s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA)
in 1994. As a consequence of the multilateral trade negotiations, the second half of the 20th century
has seen several striking developments in regard of agricultural distortions. Distortions to agricul-
tural markets through policy measures have undergone significant changes with very different trends
occurring in different geographical regions in the world.
The last three decades have seen several attempts of analyzing the degree of agricultural distortions
and the drivers for reforms in different countries all over the world. All empirical publications are
based on either one of two (across countries comparable) data sources on this matter. Since 1987
the OECD offers a yearly monitoring on agricultural support and an online database with several
indicators for agricultural distortion, covering 23 OECD and Non-OECD countries.1 In addition, in
2010 an extensive World Bank research project collected and estimated agricultural distortion data
and updated this database in 2013.2
Figure 1 and 2 provide a descriptive overview on the developments of the different measures for agri-
cultural distortions over time and by also distinguishing across different country groups. The OECD’s
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) measure is defined as total of all “policy transfers to agricultural
producers, measured at the farm gate and expressed as a share of gross farm receipts” (OECD 2016).
1The OECD database can be accessed online via www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/
producerandconsumersupportestimatesdatabase.htm.
2The World Bank database is available at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions (Anderson and Nelgen 2013).
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According to Anderson (2009), “[T]he nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is defined as the percentage by
which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the
government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA < 0)”. The former measure for market distortions
in agricultural markets is thus directly linked to all income-related support measures granted to farm-
ers, while the NRA more systematically captures the price effects of any policy support. As indicated
in Figure 1, the overall level of support for agriculture follows a downward trend over the time period
spanning the years from 1995 to 2015 captured by the OECD’s PSE database for agricultural policies
and support. However, this observation should not detract from the fact that the developments are
heterogeneous across advanced and emerging market economies. While in the former support has been
declining as a percentage of gross farm receipts, total agriculture support is increasing in the latter
group of countries. Given the opposite starting position in 1995, this leads to a convergence in agri-
cultural markets support and, since 2014, the non-OECD countries offer more generous policy support
for farmers as compared to the included OECD-member states.
Figure 1: Evolution of Producer Support Estimate (PSE) , 1995 to 2015 (percentage of gross farm
receipts).
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The NRA index provided by a World Bank project is available for a longer time period spanning
the years from 1961 to 2011 and its development over time can be based on a much broader country
sample consisting of 81 countries.3 Furthermore, the NRA is expressed as percentage of the undistorted
price which is not the case for OECD’s PSE measure which considerably simplifies its interpretation
(Anderson 2009). Unfortunately, the dataset has only been updated until 2011 which does not allow
to account for the most recent developments. However, a visual inspection of Figure 2 indicates that
the NRA captures very similar dynamics as the PSE indicator. In particular, in the OECD economies
distortions in agricultural markets have been at a rise until the late 1980s while policy support for
3Due to data limitations regarding the control variables necessary for the econometric analysis discussed in Sections
3 and 4, Côte d’Ivoire, Island, Malta, Sudan and Taiwan can only be included in this descriptive section.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) in OECD, non-OECD and BRICS
countries, 1961 to 2011.
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Notes: Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2013). NRA: Nominal Rate of Assistance is an index for distortions to agricultural
prices. BRICS countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The displayed values are weighted averages of
the countries’ NRA by their value of agricultural production.
farmers substantially decreased afterwards. In the average OECD economy (based on agricultural
GDP share-weighted country average), in 2011 the market distortion in terms of a percentage increase
relative to the undistorted price amounts to only less than one-third of the relative distortion observed
in 1986. Furthermore, Figure 2 also indicates that in lower middle income countries and especially the
BRICS economies, agricultural support levels have been growing over the last three decades. During the
1980s and until the mid-1990s, these economies have taxed agricultural outputs above the standard
value-added tax level for other goods which translated into a negative market distortion and lower
prices for producers. Since 1995, however, the group of lower middle income countries and the BRICS
economies have started to (heavily) subsidize agricultural production and until 2011 almost reached
the level of market distortions (in terms of above undistorted market prizes) of the OECD economies.
The process of agricultural policy setting seems to follow to certain extent a pattern which is consistent
with the descriptive evidence provided in Figures 1 and 2. Three observed phases along the process of
economic development have been identified: Countries at the low income levels could regard their large
agriculture sectors as source for governmental revenues and tax agriculture to extract resources from
the sector and facilitate non-agricultural developments. With accelerated economic growth, countries
often tend to provide net support to the agriculture population as their incomes do not keep pace
with non-agricultural sectors and the reallocation of their labor force faces difficulties. Governments
therefore tend to transfer income to the agricultural sector to mitigate these disparities. The third phase
taking place at a higher economic development stage is characterized by new policy objectives gaining
importance in the respective countries. In order to comply with the new topics such as environmental
concerns and sustainability requirements, competitiveness of the sector and stabilizing farm incomes,
governments tend to shift their focus towards less market price distorting measures but rather payments
which are subject to specific conditions (OECD 2013).
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As a consequence and for an accurate interpretation of the overall developments in agricultural policy,
it is important to distinguish between distortions and support. As among others Swinnen et al. (2012)
argue that while the total level of support to farmers has not changed much in OECD countries, the
most distortive measures indeed have been abandoned. This is due to a shift towards policies such
as direct payments which have less or no effect on prices faced by farmers and are not considered as
market distorting (Swinnen et al. 2012). This paper is interested in analyzing agricultural distortions to
markets and, therefore, relies on the NRA as the preferred indicator which measures price differentials
induced by agricultural policy measures.
2.2 A Brief Review of the Literature
There is little dispute in the literature over the observed patterns of agricultural support and the
simultaneous occurrence of changes in macroeconomic conditions and agricultural support. However,
causality is more complex and of high interest if one wants to elaborate on possible future scenarios for
agricultural policies. This is especially relevant given the level of support in emerging market economies
is now exceeding the ones provided by the OECD countries which could possibly lead to a turnaround
in the gross total support of all countries. In return this is expected to have a significant impact
on world agricultural commodity markets. Academics and policy advisers have been puzzled by the
determination of trends in agricultural support and how their developments seem to be resisting any
advocacy of greater market-orientation. Political economy arguments have been heavily involved in
analyzing and explaining the determining factors of changes in agricultural support policies. From the
numerous empirical studies conducted over the last decades three main patterns based on empirical
evidence can be identified (see Swinnen et al. 2012, for a survey): First, the development pattern
refers to the already mentioned shift in policies from taxing the agricultural sector to subsidizing and
protecting the same with increasing rates, as countries move up the scale of economic development.
Second, the anti-trade pattern is based on the observation that import competing sectors generally
witness more protection than exporting sectors. In addition, net-exporting economies tend to generally
provide lower levels of agricultural support. Third, the anti-comparative advantage pattern refers to
the negative correlation between comparative advantage in and support for an agricultural production
sector.
The macroeconomic and structural indicators, which the observable patterns refer to, correlate with
political economy determinants of agriculture support. The relationship between various structural
variables is well explored, such as the decreasing share of agriculture in the economy with a growing
economy but the connection to agriculture support is less thoroughly examined. Yet, the World
Bank focused on the relationship between the development of distortions to agricultural incentives and
political economy reasoning in a large research program carried out during the years from 2006 to 2009,
providing a detailed summary of the main findings in e.g., Anderson (2010).
The theoretical literature on endogenous policy determination suggests that agricultural protection
tends to rise with increasing GDP and declining share of agriculture in the economy and when con-
sumers spend a lower share of their budget on food (Brooks 1996). With economic development and
growing GDP, per capita incomes increase and, following Engel’s law, a smaller share of a household’s
budget is spent on food (Engel 1857). In combination with Downs’ claim of consumers’ rational igno-
rance increasing support faces less resistance. Downs (1957) called consumers and taxpayers rationally
ignorant when they pay less attention to government policies where the costs of becoming fully in-
formed about the policy effects outweigh the potential individual benefits stemming from alternative
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policies. Since the costs of agricultural programs affect consumers and taxpayers less as they spend a
smaller proportion of their increasing incomes on food they have fewer incentives to exert countervailing
pressure.
Moreover, as the economy grows and the share of agriculture in total employment declines, implying
that the size of the potential interest group of farmers shrinks, their collective action becomes more
effective. Olson (1965) famously stated that free riders present the main obstacle to effective collective
action such as lobbying for more policy support. With diminishing numbers, groups find it easier to
overcome this free-rider problem because the incentive to actually free ride on group activity increases
with the size of the group and therefore the coordination and enforcement costs increase. Buchanan
and Tullock (1962) argued already in an earlier contribution that collective decision making will be
more effective in smaller groups, because of lower participation and organizational costs involved in
the policy process.
Another observation of past developments is that, as the country’s economy develops, incomes in the
non-agricultural economy typically grow at a faster rate than in the agriculture sector. The ongoing
competitive process forces farmers, who cannot match cost reduction, out of the market unless they
look for non-market sources of income such as e.g., governmental support. Clearly, farmers who may
be forced to leave the sector have a high incentive to lobby for more support (Brooks 1996). Similar
reasoning could explain the observed greater policy support in sectors with a comparative disadvantage.
The incentive for governments to exchange transfers for political support is increasing with declining
relative incomes in the farming sector. This relationship has been first described formally by De
Gorter and Tsur (1991). Therefore, the anti-comparative advantage pattern is often also referred to as
a relative-income pattern (Swinnen 2010).
The last macroeconomic variable to discuss in the context of endogenous policy determination is the
agricultural trade balance. The literature predicts that agricultural exports will be subsidized less
(or taxed more) as compared to agricultural imports. The costs of distorting transfers increase with
an increasing trade surplus, because both the dead-weight loss of the distortion itself and the actual
transfer costs increase with higher subsidization (Brooks 1996). The motive of intervening in trade in
a way to lower domestic prices is again related to the share of consumers expenditures on food and the
effect on government border tax revenues (Swinnen 2010). Anderson (2010) points to another reason
regarding the observed anti-trade patterns in developing countries over the past: “Part of the anti-
trade bias in developing countries was the result of government intervention in the domestic market
for foreign currency. The most common arrangement was a dual exchange rate, whereby exporters had
to sell part or all of their foreign currency to the government at a low price. This effectively taxed
and thus discouraged production of exportables. At the same time it created an artificial shortage of
foreign currency so that potential importers bid up its purchase price, which had the same effect as an
import tax and thus encouraged import-competing production” . Yet another argument in addition to
the already mentioned costs associated with supporting exports could be that countries tend to face
stronger retaliation from other countries as more subsidized exports flood the international market,
whilst support for imports may cause no policy response from the trading partners.
One could argue that the most relevant factor affecting agricultural policy is constituted by interna-
tional trade agreements. The members of the former GATT and now WTO have been reluctant to
agree on multilateral agreements especially in agriculture. Nevertheless, when they did, the impact
on support policies was profound across countries. Over recent decades, from the Uruguay round
(URAA), the establishment of the WTO and the Doha round up to the Bali package and the latest
Nairobi package the stepwise deepening of multilateral trade agreements has been shaping agriculture
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support policies. As already discussed in the introduction, the URAA is often referred to as one of
the key events of liberalization in world trade and as a consequence thereof it is subject to extensive
scientific discussions. Surprisingly, there is little econometric work on this issue, at least not to the
extent as it attracts interest in the discussions. The general consensus of experts seems to be that while
the URAA may have constrained the growth of agricultural protection it has done little to reduce it,
at least in the countries that were GATT members during the negotiations (Anania, Bohman, Carter,
and McCalla 2004).
A potential explanation for why the URAA has had no or limited impact on market distortion in
agricultural markets can be found in the tariff regulation agreed under WTO rules. For developing
economies the tariff rates are fixed well above the actual applied tariffs at the time the negotiations
took place. Thus, for example China bound its tariffs at an average level of 16.5 percent while its
respective NRA at the time it joined the WTO only amounted 7.3 percent. This has been similarly
true for several other developing and emerging economies (Anderson 2010).
Furthermore, there are several obstacles for adequately measuring and quantifying the impact the
URRA agreement. One is that they may be anticipated and thus the policy change actually happened
prior to the official signature of the agreement. Furthermore, the starting conditions in terms of a
country’s embeddedness in (already) existing trade agreements and the extent of agricultural markets
liberalization differed across countries which complicates the identification of any WTO effects. “For
example, among the 14 transition countries the impact of the GATT/WTO on their agricultural policies
differs strongly depending on whether they were part of the GATT before 1995 or not” (Swinnen 2010).
Nevertheless, trade talks certainly do play a role, as do transparent information and policy advice,
provided for example by the OECD with its public and regularly updated database on agricultural
support. However, recent empirical contributions such as e.g., Swinnen et al. (2012) could not find a
significant market distortion reducing effect of the URAA using OECD data. Cadot, Olarreaga, and
Tschopp (2010) find a weakly significant effect of the URAA in terms of reducing the volatility of
agricultural support over time.
Besides the multilateral trade talks within the WTO context, bilateral free trade agreements have
gained importance in international trade relations and are expected to influence both the degree of
market access and distortion to agricultural markets. The subsequent analysis offered in this paper
utilizes the Design of Trade Agreements Database (DESTA) which, as of June 2016, contains more than
800 agreements. This database, thus, most comprehensively captures trade agreements and, in contrast
to most other trade agreements listings, provides additional information on the depth of the respective
agreements (Dür et al. 2014). According to DESTA the number of bilateral trade agreements has
increased significantly over the last 25 years and according to Dür et al. (2014) the signed agreements
also became deeper in terms of their scope and how comprehensively they regulate trade relationships.
Figure 3 illustrates this point by plotting the number of annually signed bilateral free trade agreements
together with the cumulative number of such agreements in force. Until the early 1990s, bilateral free
trade agreements have been negotiated only very infrequently and, as a consequence, a total of 100
agreements in force has been reached only in 1993. Starting with the 1990s the number of annually
signed bilateral free trade agreements almost exploded, reaching a maximum of 35 signed bilateral
agreements in 1992. Furthermore, this trend in the popularity of signing bilateral free trade agreements
continues until today amounting to an impressive number of almost 500 cumulative such agreements
being in force in 2015.
Whether regionalism and multilateralism are antagonistic forms of liberalization is not at all established
in the literature. One side sees them as substituting international attempts, others call and hope these
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Figure 3: Number of Signed Free Trade Agreements, 1955 to 2015).
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agreements to be a source of traction for multilateral liberalization or even a consequence of the success
of multilateral trade agreements (Bagwell et al. 2016; Ethier 1998; Freund 2000; Ornelas 2005). While
the verdict on the overall effect of trade agreements on trade and price policies is still out, the notion
is that intra-member trade barriers are indeed reduced. Furthermore, free trade agreements may also
influence agricultural distortions even in the cases where agriculture is not explicitly a subject of the
agreement itself. Intensified bilateral trade relationships might (at least in the long-run) induce market
openings in all markets including the one for agricultural products. However, simply interpreting the
number of signed trade agreements by a country as a proxy for the economies openness to trade
would be oversimplifying. A number of trade agreements do in fact include binding declarations
concerning agricultural distortions. Thus, as an example, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) provides specific regulation on tariff reduction and tariff quotas for Canadian, Mexican and
US agriculture policies (Canada 2016).
Based on the agricultural distortions database the World Bank project conducted a number of em-
pirical analyses concerning the influential factors for market distortions in agriculture. Among them,
Masters and Garcia (2010) test the political economy hypotheses focusing on the above discussed de-
velopment, anti-trade and resource abundance arguments, respectively. The applied OLS-regressions
yield significant results for the respective coefficients and confirm the stylized facts obtained from
descriptive statistics. In particular, GDP per capita growth increases the NRA, exportable products
are more strongly supported and land endowment, proposed as a proxy for comparative advantage,
has a negative effect on market distortions. The use of land-endowment as variable for comparative
advantage has severe disadvantages, including missing or falsely reported values, but has also been
challenged based on more fundamental and theoretical reasoning. The latter is underpinned by skep-
ticism whether arable land without considering water resources or capital can be seen as proxy for
productivity since land on its own is not productive (OECD 2013).
Gawande and Hoekman (2010) look at land endowment, rural population size and political institu-
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tions indicators and their effects on agricultural distortions. The results obtained from fixed effects
estimation suggest that countries with larger land and labor endowments tend to increase taxation of
agricultural production while, on the other hand, more intense electoral competition tends to increase
subsidization of the agricultural sector. Additionally to the already mentioned critique put forward
against the use of a land variable, another limitation is that the included political institution indicator
only allows to distinguish whether there are multiple parties or candidates to choose from at all. Fur-
thermore, the applied empirical measure for political institutions assigns a full democracy status to all
countries where the leading party controls just under 75 percent of the seats in the legislature (Cruz,
Keefer, and Scartascini 2016). This leads to a loss of information and complicates the interpretation
due to missing variation and distinction. Including a larger set of institutional indicators, Olper and
Raimondi (2010) claim that the level of agricultural protection increases with transition into stable
proportional democracies.
The above mentioned results are based on either the NRA or the RRA as dependent variable to be
explained. The OECD database is used for an quantitative analysis in the Agricultural Policy Moni-
toring and Evaluation Report from 2013 (OECD 2013). There, income, the importance of agriculture
in the respective economy and again land endowment are tested as explanatory variables and the find-
ings confirm the existence of policy patterns. Interestingly, the so far discussed literature exclusively
rely on static econometric model specifications which only allow to assess the long-run impacts of
the respective (policy) variables on market distortions in agricultural markets. Swinnen et al. (2012),
by contrast, propose the application of a dynamic model and apply a GMM-based estimator for the
OECD’s producer support indicator as dependent variable to explain the WTO’s effect on agricultural
trade liberalization while controlling for income and trade effects. Their findings suggest that the
WTO rather supported a shift towards less distorting measures while they cannot find a statistical
significant WTO effect on the level of overall agricultural support. Furthermore, they also highlight the
persistence in market distortions over time which suggests that the static models applied previously
are likley misspecified.
This paper builds on the methodological approach suggested by Swinnen et al. (2012) and formulates
a dynamic specification which is estimated by means of different dynamic panel data methods. For the
inclusion of control variables we follow the above discussed literature and augment it with information
on bilateral trade agreements in order to assess the short- and long-run effects of multilateral versus
bilateral trade policies for distortions in agricultural markets. Furthermore, the paper makes use of
the larger World Bank database and (mainly) relies on the NRA as the dependent variable of interest.
3 Data, Empirical Specification and Estimation
The data used for the empirical analysis are provided by various different sources including international
organizations and databases provided by scientists. The key dependent variable is the indicator for
agricultural Ddistortions from the World Bank Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives
Database constructed by Anderson and Nelgen (2013). The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) captures
the absolute level of distortions to agricultural prices. "In other words it measures distortions imposed
by governments that create a gap between current domestic prices and the prices that would exist under
free markets" (Anderson et al. 2013). Formally, the NRA is defined as:
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NRAi,t =
Pdi,t − Pfi,t
Pfi,t
, (1)
where Pdi,t denotes the observed domestic price in country i and year t, Pfi,t is the estimated price
in absence of any market distortions. Therefore, the NRA would amount to 0 under a complete free
trade environment. It is positive when prices are artificially inflated and negative when producers are
net taxed.4
The main explanatory variables of interest are the dummy variable URAA and the number of free
trade agreements (FTA). The URAA dummy variable takes on the value of one from 1994 onwards for
all countries which are among the initial signature states of the Uruguay Agreement and for all other
countries starting with the year of their WTO accession. Otherwise the value of the WTO variable is
equal to zero. Following Persson (2005) and Swinnen et al. (2012), we additionally control for potential
anticipation effects of the Uruguay agreement by including a dummy variable which amounts to one
in the six years preceding the official creation of the WTO in 1995 and zero otherwise. For countries
joining the WTO in later years (such as e.g., China), the dummy variable amounts to one in the
six years prior to their accession and to zero in all other years. FTA expresses the number of (full)
bilateral free trade agreements signed by each individual country according to the data collected in
DESTA (Dür et al. 2014).5
In order to estimate the – ceteris paribus – effects of both multilateral and bilateral trade agreements,
the model controls for the effects of several other country characteristics discussed in the previous
section and drawing from the recent (empirical) literature. Regarding the other explanatory variables,
data for (log) real GDP per capita (i.e., income) measured and agriculture value added per worker are
taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database6. Agricultural exports and
imports are retrieved from the FAOSTAT trade database7 and are used to construct a relative measure
for the agricultural trade balance by dividing net exports in agricultural products by a country’s total
trade volume in this industry. Furthermore, and in order to control for the relative-income pattern
suggested in the literature the specification also accounts for agricultural (log) value added per worker
(AV A) as an indicator for comparative advantage offered by the World Bank data. Referring to the
findings from previous literature, we also include a measure for political institutions based on political
regime characteristics ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) collected
in the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Database (Marshall, Jaggers, and
Gurr 2014).8
Formally, the resulting dynamic panel data specification to be estimated reads as follows:
4The World Bank database also offers the relative rate of aAssistance which additional takes into account market
distortions for manufacturing goods and, thus, provides an estimate for either anti- or pro-agriculture biases in a country’s
support policies. Since this paper focuses on agricultural distortion only, the RRA will not be applied as it is also affected
by changes in non-agricultural policy initiatives.
5DESTA distinguishes trade agreements by depths of integration with the following categories: (1) partial scope
agreement, (2) (full) free trade agreement, (3) customs union, (4) services agreement or (5) framework agreement; no
specific provisions.
6Available online at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
7Available online at http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/home.
8Alternatively, on could also control for political orientation based on a government’s attitudes towards a market
based economy since such economies are likely to signs more bilateral trade agreements and are less reluctant to reduce
distorting agricultural support measures. However, due to lack of data availability for the respective measure an inclusion
such an indicator would led to the loss of almost half of the available observations and, therefore, we apply the mentioned
polity 2 index instead.
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NRAi,t = αNRAi,t−1 + β1URAAi,t + β2FTAi,t + xi,tγ + µi + ζt + i,t (2)
where NRAi,t is the nominal rate of assistance in country i in time t, µi denotes a country-specific effect
which captures unobserved but time-invariant characteristics and ζt are common time-specific fixed
effects (such as e.g., time trends in world food prices). i,t is the reminder error term which is assumed
to be independently but not necessarily identically distributed (i.e., we allow for heteroscedasticity).
xi,t =
[
ln(INCi,t), ln(INCi,t)
2, ATBi,t, ln(AV Ai,t), DEMi,t, URAApti,t
]
constituting a vector of all
country-time-specific control variables with the corresponding vector of estimable parameters γ. The
inclusion of the squared income term aims at capturing likely non-linear effects in the relationship
between GDP per capital and agricultural market distortions identified in the previous literature and
the Figures discussed in Section 2.1.
Furthermore, the parameter α captures the persistence in agricultural distortions over time and will be
used to calculate the long-run effects of the covariates of main interest. As discussed above, these are
the URAAi,t indicator and the number of country-time-specific (full) bilateral free trade agreements
in force (FTAi,t). Their respective estimable parameter values are denoted by β1 and β2, respectively,
which measure the short-run (direct) impacts of multilateral and bilateral trade policies on agricultural
market distortions. The long-run effect of an additionally signed trade agreement is, for example, given
by β21−α .
Equation (2) is estimated by means of various different panel data estimators. They commonly elimi-
nate µi by either applying the within-transformation or first-differencing the model specification. The
different estimators proposed vary in their assumptions relevant for identifying unbiased estimators for
the parameters associated with the lagged dependent variable (and all other predetermined character-
istics) and the number of bilateral trade agreements. In a dynamic stochastic equation, the immediate
problem that NRAi,t−1 is correlated with the error term when applying simple ordinary least squares
(OLS) to within-transformed data gives rise to the dynamic panel bias as pointed out first by Nickell
(1981). Judson and Owen (1999) discuss this issues and compares the performance of different dy-
namic panel data estimators including e.g., simple and bias-correcting OLS-estimators and generalized
methods of moments (GMM) estimators using a Monte Monte Carlo simulation exercise. Based on
their findings, the paper concludes that when the time-dimension T gets relatively large (as compared
to the number of cross-section units N), a GMM-estimation may not be practical. Instead Judson and
Owen (1999) find that for balanced panal datasets the bias-correcting approach proposed by Bun and
Kiviet (2003) outperforms other estimators. An extension of this approach for unbalanced panel data
(as are used in this exercise) is offered by Bruno (2005).
Furthermore, one could raise the objection of an apparent endogeneity problem concerning the number
of free trade agreements a country agrees on, as unobserved and time-variant preferences regarding the
liberalization of markets might be correlated with both bilateral trade policy activities and the distor-
tion in agricultural markets. This issue will be addressed by applying two instruments for the number
of bilateral free trade agreements a country agreed on: The first one is based on empirical research on
the determinants of the likelihood to sign free trade agreements which suggests that trade agreements
are highly contagious and induce domino effects (Baier, Bergstrand, and Mariutto 2014; Baldwin and
Jaimovich 2010; Egger and Larch 2008). Accordingly, we argue that bilateral trade policy activities of
neighboring economies exogenously pressure the respective countries to also engage in trade agreement
negotiations and, thus, we instrument the number of free trade agreement signed by each country itself
by the average number of trade agreements signed by a country’s (bordering) neighbors excluding all
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bilateral agreements from the neighboring countries with country i. Based on a similar reasoning and
following the approach suggested by Cadot et al. (2010), the second instrument applied is the number
of military alliances the country has joined over time. In a similar vein as for the first instrument,
integration into various military alliances is expected to foster economic integration as well, making the
signing of bilateral free trade agreements more likely. The respective data for memberships in military
alliances is taken from Gibler (2008).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NRA 1,897 0.223 0.566 -0.852 4.321
URAA 1,897 0.588 0.492 0 1
FTA 1,897 21.255 22.308 0 93
INC 1,897 12,755.65 15,363.20 123.730 69,094.75
AV A 1,897 11,056.03 15,181.39 122.748 143,036.50
ATB 1,897 0.017 0.430 -0.929 0.937
URAApt 1,897 0.767 0.423 0 1
DEM 1,897 5.098 6.135 -9 10
Table 1 provides am overview on the data sample utilized for the empirical analysis by reporting simple
descriptive statistics. The full sample contains 1,897 observations based on 76 different countries and
capturing the years ranging from 1980 to 2011.9 The dependent variable of interest, NRA takes on
a sample mean of approximately 0.23 implying that, on average, realized prices in agricultural mar-
kets are around 23% above their non-distortionary values. For about one-third of all observations, we
observe negative realizations of the NRA indicating a relative overtaxation of agricultural products
in these cases. In the remaining two-thirds of all observations agricultural products are, however, net
subsidized translating into above free market prices.
With regard to the main trade policy variables of interest, in around 59% of all observations, the
countries are member states of WTO and thus took part in the multilateral trade liberalization policies
agreed on in the Uruguay round. In terms of bilateral trade relationships we observe a relatively large
variation in signed agreements across countries and time (see also Figure 3). On average, each country
agreed on approximately 21 bilateral trade agreements over the whole sample period. Germany most
actively signs bilateral trade agreements and at the end of our sample period had 93 such agreements in
force. In 2011 all countries available in the sample had agreed on at least one bilateral trade agreement
while in 2010 Ecuador and Nigeria formed the last two countries without having any bilateral trade
agreement (as defined above) in force.
4 Estimation Results and Discussion
Table 2 reports the main results from estimating Equation (2) using various different (dynamic) panel
data estimators. Column 1 displays the parameters obtained from simple within-transformed (fixed
effects) estimation. The results in Columns 2 and 3 explicitly account for the Nickel bias by applying
the bias-corrected least squares dummy (LSDV) estimator (Column 2) and a GMM-based approach
9A detailed description of the sample composition is offered in Table A1 in the appendix.
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(Column 3). In column (4) we turn to the potential endogeneity of the number of bilateral trade
agreements signed and thus provide results from fixed-effects instrumental variables (IV) estimation,
applying the average number of bilateral trade agreements signed by a country’s neighboring economies
excluding the direct bilateral trade agreements signed as our instrument. Due to the fact that multi-
coliniarity is a more severe issue in instrumental variables estimation, we rely on a more parsimonious
specification when applying the GMM estimator excluding the squared-term of (log) income.10 As
internal instruments and based on the Hanson J-test we use the levels of the third and fourth lag
thereby restricting the number of instruments to remain relatively small. As additional instruments,
we use both the average number of free trade agreements signed by neighboring economies and the
number of military alliances in which the country participates. We further assume (log) income, the
democratization score and WTO membership to be predetermined.
Table 2: Main estimation results
Fixed-Effects LSDV-corrected GMM Fixed Effects IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NRAi,t−1 0.719∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.058) (0.045)
URAAi,t −0.023 −0.021 −0.011 −0.022
(0.024) (0.038) (0.121) (0.025)
FTAi,t −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(INCi,t) 0.429
∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.091) (0.091) (0.120)
ln(INCi,t)
2 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ - −0.022∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) - (0.008)
ln(AV Ai,t) −0.038 −0.028 −0.209∗∗ −0.040
(0.039) (0.023) (0.094) (0.027)
ATBi,t −0.090∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.124 −0.084∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.030) (0.081) (0.028)
URAApti,t −0.033 −0.032 −0.042 −0.033
(0.029) (0.044) (0.200) (0.032)
DEMi,t 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
No. of instruments - - 89 1
Partial F-statistic - - - 1010.48
Hanson J-test: p-value - - 0.778 -
AR(1): p-value - - 0.000 -
AR(2): p-value - - 0.144 -
R2a 0.688 - - 0.675
Obersavtions 1,897 1,897 1,765 1,895
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the country-level in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ . . . significant at
10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. In column (4) FTAi,t is instrumented with the average
number of bilateral trade agreements signed by the neighboring economies excluding the direct
bilateral trade relationships.
Starting the discussion with the results regarding the control variables first, the different estimators
provide remarkably similar results. A country’s average income level measured in terms of GDP per
capita exhibits a robust positive but diminishing impact on the NRA indicated by the significant posi-
tive parameters associated with linear income term and the significant negative parameters associated
10When applying the GMM-approach to the full-specifiction all control variables lose their statistical significance, while
the estimates for the lagged NRA and for FTA are hardly affected. These results are available from the authors upon
request.
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with squared income (see Columns 1, 2 and 4). Equipped with the estimated parameters associated
with both different income terms and the distribution of (log) income within the sample (see Table 1),
we can calculate the overall income effects for different income levels. Accordingly, the overall effect
of income on agricultural market distortions remains positive throughout the whole income distribu-
tion and across the different estimators applied. Market distortions in agricultural markets are thus
increasing with a country’s income but at a decreasing rate.
Furthermore and also in line with the previous literature, Table 2 reveals significant negative effects
of a country’s agricultural trade balance implying that countries which are net exports of agricultural
products are less engaged in providing political support in order to distort agricultural markets. This
effect again remains very stable across most of the different estimation methods applied. In a similar
vein, more democratic political regimes tend to systematically distort agricultural markets. This is
indicated by the positive and statistically highly significant parameter estimates which are, however,
not very sizeable in economic terms (see Columns 1, 2 and 4). Finally, variation in labor productivity
in the agricultural industry, as measured by (log) value added per employee is not able to additionally
explain the remaining variation in agricultural market distortions. The only exception for this is
offered by the results from the GMM-estimator for which we identify a statistically significant negative
parameter estimate associated with with ln(AV Ai,t).
Turning our attention to the persistence in agricultural market distortions as governed by the parameter
estimates corresponding to lagged NRAi,t−1, we are not able to identify a substantial Nickel Bias in
Columns (2) and (4). The parameter values obtained from simple within OLS and fixed-effects IV
are only slightly smaller as the ones obtained from the bias-corrected OLS estimator and from system
GMM. Due to the relatively large time-dimension (capturing 33 years) together with a relatively small
number of cross-sectional units, these findings are consistent with the simulation exercise provided in
Judson and Owen (1999). For the subsequent discussion of the findings associated with the variables
of main interest this implies that we can safely rely on the simpler estimators proposed. Furthermore,
these results do also not vary substantially across the different estimators which gives support to the
robustness of our main findings.
Focusing on the short-run effects of multilateral trade negotiations first, our results point to a limited
contribution of the WTO membership for decreasing market distortions in international agricultural
markets. Neither direct membership captured by URRAAi,t nor potential membership anticipation
(measured via URAApti,t) are indicted to directly affect the observed NRAi,t. The estimated parame-
ters are all insignificant throughout. This finding is well in line with the evidence provided by Swinnen
et al. (2012). In contrast to this we are able to identify statistically significant and negative effects
for bilateral trade agreements. Accordingly, an increase in the number of bilateral trade agreements
a country has in force reduces market distortions in its agricultural market. In quantitative terms
and at a first glance the estimated effect seems rather small varying between -0.002 (obtained from
the bias corrected OLS estimator and the GMM estimator) and -0.004 when accounting for potential
endogeneity of the number of bilateral trade agreements in the fixed-effects IV estimator. However,
when accounting for the variation in the number of bilateral trade agreements signed, the effect of
bilateral trade agreements turn out to be quite sizeable. Accordingly and in the short-run only, a one
standard deviation increase in the number of signed trade agreements (i.e., 22.3) decreases the NRA
by a magnitude of between -0.045 and -0.089. In the long-run the estimated effects of a one standard
deviation increase in the number of bilateral trade agreements are substantially larger and amount to
-0.202 and -0.309. Put differently, in the long-run one standard deviation in the number of bilateral
trade agreements is able to explain approximately one-half of the standard deviation in the observed
NRA distribution (which amounts to 0.566, see Table 1). Based on our estimates, bilateral trade pol-
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icy is identified as a crucial additional determinant of the level of market distortions in international
agricultural markets which has been mainly ignored in the literature so far. While multilaterilism
seems to be ineffective in reducing political support for agricultural products both in the short- and
long-run, bilateral trade agreements seem to systematically contribute to the removal of such barriers
for agricultural market liberalization.
Due to likely endogeneity of the number of bilateral trade agreements (and the absence of strong
evidence for a Nickel bias) we prefer the fixed-effects IV estimator with its corresponding results being
displayed in Column (4) and subsequently further investigate the robustness of our main finding relying
on this estimator only. The respective estimation results are reported in Columns (1) to (8) of Table
3. Column (1) uses the lagged value of the average number of neighboring FTAs, Column (2) uses
both the lagged and the contemporaneous realizations of this instrument. Columns (3) and (4) rely
on four years lagged values of the average free trade agreements signed by the neighboring economies
excluding as usual all direct bilateral relationships. Column (4) adds the fours years lag of the own
number of signed bilateral trade agreements as an additional instrument. In column (5) we provide a
reduced form estimate for FTAi,t by using WTO membership as an additional instrument. This choice
is motivated by insignificant direct effects identified for WTO membership in the baseline estimates
provided in Table 2. Accordingly, one could argue that taking part in the WTO might shift the
probability of additionally signing bilateral free-trade agreements which would qualify URAAi,t to be
a useful instrument. In Columns (6) and (7) we alternatively apply the number of military alliances
in which the countries participate as instrument. In the former, we only rely on this instrument while
Column (7) provides the results based on the joint inclusion of both instruments discussed in Section
3. The final column re-estimates our baseline specification from Column (4) of Table 2 for the smaller
sample based on the OECD PSE data sample and relying on the NAC instead of the NRA as the
outcome variable of interest.
The partial F -statistics reported at the bottom of Table 3 commonly point to the relevance of the
instruments applied (similar to the one reported in Column 4 of Table 2). These values are all well
above the rule of thumb criteria requiring the partial F to be above 10 (Stock, Wright, and Yogo
2002). Furthermore, for all cases in which we include more than just one instrument, the p-values
associated with Hanson J-tests support our assumption concerning the exogeneity of the used instru-
ments. Across all different specification applied, the effect of our main variable of interest remains
remarkably stable. Accordingly and in line with our baseline results, signing one additional bilateral
trade agreement reduces the NRA of a participating economy by 0.004 to 0.005. This effect only loses
its statistically significance in Column (8) where we alternatively rely on the OECD PSE data instead
of the agricultural distortion database. However, given the small number of less than 500 observations
and the small country coverage provided in the PSE database, this result does not come as a big
surprise. In qualitative terms the FTA effect from Column (8) is very similar to the ones identified
in the specifications lending additional support to our main findings. Taking all the findings from the
alternative estimators and specifications together, the empirical analysis carried out in this section
suggests a statistically significant and economically relevant impact of bilateral trade agreements for
reducing market distortions in agricultural markets.
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5 Conclusions
This paper builds on the empirical literature on distortions in agricultural markets and puts a specific
focus on the role of international trade negotiations for shaping the institutional framework for agricul-
tural policies. In particular, we study the short- and long-run effects of multilateral and bilateral trade
agreements for reducing market distortions in agricultural markets. For separating the short-run from
the long-run effects of trade policy, we formulate a dynamic panel data equation which is theoretically
motivated by political economy reasoning for agricultural policy. The resulting econometric specifica-
tion is then estimated by means of various different panel data methods including simple fixed-effects
OLS and IV estimators, the least square dummy variable corrected (LSDVC) estimator and a more
general GMM-based approach. The empirical estimates based on the alternative econometric methods
applied point to a remarkably robustness of the main results and further do not indicate any sub-
stantive dynamic panel data bias. Given the relatively long time-dimension of 32 years in the dataset
the latter result does not come as a big surprise and is well in line with econometric research on the
performance of different dynamic panel data estimators.
With regard to previous empirical literature on market distortions in agricultural markets, we are able
to confirm the main findings using an enlarged and updated dataset capturing 76 economies for the
years ranging from 1980 to 2011. In particular, a growing per capita income in a country leads to an
increase in political support for agricultural producers inducing positive price distortions as measured
by the World Bank’s nominal rate of assistance (NRA). Our estimates indicate a non-linear relation-
ship between income and market distortions in agricultural markets, indicating that price distorting
subsidies are getting smaller with income. By contrast, low income countries generally still tend to
depress producer prices by overtaxing agricultural products. (see, e.g., Table A1 in the Appendix).
High income countries tend to redesign their political support measures such that they are less price
distorting which is also consistent with the non-linear relationship identified empirically. Furthermore,
economies with a positive net trade balance tend to grant lower support levels or even depress prices
for exporters and producers while – ceteris paribus – countries with more sophisticated democratic
institutions tend to provide more price distorting support measures for agricultural products.
Putting the focus on the impact of multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations on agricultural market
distortions, we obtain heterogeneous and potentially policy relevant results. First of all, we are not
able to identify any significant liberalization effects stemming from the WTO’s Uruguay agreement
for the sample country at hand. The estimates tend to be negative throughout, which would be
associated with decreasing market distortions, but lack statistical significance in all specifications and
across the various alternative econometric estimators applied. This finding is well in line with the
results provided by Swinnen et al. (2012) who do not find significant distortion reducing WTO effects
using the OECD’s Producer Support Estimates data instead. Putting this finding into perspective,
economists tend to agree that the GATT and the WTO have been successful in liberalizing trade
for manufacturing goods. However, the verdict is less conclusive when it comes to the agricultural
sector and in particular skepticism has been articulated with regard to the first major trade agreement
concentrating on agricultural markets - the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (Swinnen et
al. 2012). The OECD (2001) called the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture a watershed, in
the sense that agriculture was finally subjected to multilateral rules and disciplines, but only finds
moderate trade barrier reduction associated with this agreement. Furthermore, this agreement can
be seen as an international framework for standardizing the evaluation of tariffs and defining common
areas of focus for specific reforms (Cahill and Brooks 2001; OECD 2001), but given all the available
evidence has yet not systematically contributed to the reduction of agricultural market distortions
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across the world.
Turning the attention to the key finding of this paper, the phenomenon triggered in the 1990s of a
surging number of signed bilateral trade agreements is without a doubt one of the most significant
changes in international trade relationships over this period of time and not surprisingly influences
market access and the level of agricultural price distortions. In our exercise the variation in the signed
bilateral trade agreements by countries systematically explains differences in agricultural market dis-
tortions. In our preferred specification (Column 4 of Table 2), a one standard deviation increase in the
number of bilateral agreements in force (i.e., 22.3 agreements) decreases the nominal assistance coeffi-
cient by -0.089 and -0.309 in the short- and long-run, respectively. These effects are also economically
relevant indicating that bilateral trade agreements substantially contribute to fostering efficiency in
agricultural markets. Putting all empirical findings from this paper together, regional trade policy and
bilateralism seem to constitute be the most effective trade policy tools for reducing market distortions
in agricultural markets.
From the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA, the various bilateral EU
agreements with other countries to the preliminary entry into force of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) and the long lasting attempts to conclude on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP) between the USA and the EU, regionalism has been seen as the prime vehicle for further
fostering international market integration by reducing remaining barriers to trade (Matthews 2013).
With Great Britain’s decision to leave the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as the
45th president of the United States both taking place in 2016, the political views on regionalism and
bilateral trade agreements seem to have been substantially reversed and a lot of skepticism towards
free trade and globalization has been articulated. Taking our estimation results literally, policies which
would roll back bilateral trade agreements are expected to increase market distortions in agricultural
markets inducing price rises for the consumers of such goods. From a distributional point of view this
would likely hurt the lowest income groups the most, as relying on Engel’s law these households use a
larger share of total expenditures for the consumption of agricultural products.
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Appendix: Country Coverage and Sample Composition
Table A1: Country coverage and sample overview
Country- First Last NRA NRA
code obs. obs. initial year latest year
ARG 1980 2010 −0.059 −0.282
AUS 1980 2009 0.036 0.000
AUT 1980 2011 0.185 0.019
BEL 1980 2011 0.547 0.040
BEN 1980 2005 −0.006 0.003
BFA 1980 2010 −0.032 −0.237
BGD 1980 2009 −0.099 −0.425
BGR 1992 2011 −0.318 0.010
BRA 1980 2010 −0.318 0.009
CAN 1980 2011 0.183 0.097
CHE 1980 2011 2.297 0.538
CHL 1980 2011 0.056 0.002
CHN 1981 2010 −0.533 0.161
CIV 1980 2009 −0.406 −0.331
CMR 1980 2009 −0.156 −0.068
COL 1980 2010 −0.049 0.387
CYP 2005 2011 0.167 0.035
CZE 1992 2011 0.182 0.016
DEU 1980 2011 0.559 0.020
DNK 1980 2011 0.583 0.014
DOM 1980 2010 −0.255 0.430
ECU 1980 2010 −0.071 −0.248
EGY 1980 2010 −0.360 0.028
ESP 1980 2011 −0.184 0.021
EST 1992 2011 −0.390 0.019
ETH 1981 2010 −0.100 −0.224
FIN 1980 2011 0.401 0.023
FRA 1980 2011 0.504 0.018
GBR 1980 2011 0.585 0.032
GHA 1980 2010 −0.231 −0.052
GRC 1981 2011 0.537 0.020
HUN 1992 2011 0.158 0.017
IDN 1980 2010 −0.035 0.293
IND 1980 2010 −0.089 0.139
IRL 1980 2011 0.604 0.029
ISL 1980 2011 2.326 0.532
ISR 1995 2011 0.204 0.134
ITA 1980 2011 0.359 0.024
JPN 1980 2011 1.006 0.997
KAZ 1995 2011 0.177 0.088
KEN 1980 2010 −0.380 −0.106
Continued on next page
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Table A1: Continued from previous page
Country- First Last NRA NRA
code obs. obs. initial year latest year
KOR 1980 2011 1.120 1.046
LKA 1980 2010 −0.334 −0.164
LTU 1992 2011 −0.459 0.023
LVA 1992 2011 −0.460 0.023
MAL 2005 2011 0.145 0.031
MAR 1995 2009 0.595 0.471
MDG 1980 2010 −0.347 −0.150
MEX 1980 2011 0.052 0.029
MLI 1980 2010 −0.050 −0.290
MOZ 1980 2010 −0.450 0.364
MYS 1980 2010 −0.172 0.343
NGA 1980 2010 0.094 −0.006
NIC 1991 2010 −0.081 −0.125
NLD 1980 2011 0.748 0.039
NOR 1980 2011 2.785 0.842
NZL 1980 2011 0.159 0.007
PAK 1980 2010 −0.201 −0.086
PHL 1980 2010 −0.155 0.253
POL 1992 2011 −0.039 0.034
PRT 1980 2011 0.304 0.029
ROM 1992 2011 0.090 0.017
RUS 1992 2010 −0.483 0.152
SDN 1980 2010 −0.360 −0.004
SEN 1980 2005 −0.432 0.160
SVK 1992 2011 0.243 0.014
SVN 1992 2011 0.643 0.034
SWE 1980 2011 0.738 0.021
TCD 1980 2005 −0.053 0.005
TGO 1980 2010 −0.014 −0.134
THA 1980 2010 −0.121 0.104
TUR 1980 2011 −0.237 0.249
TWN 1980 2011 0.286 0.234
TZA 1980 2010 −0.599 0.046
UGA 1980 2011 −0.094 −0.280
UKR 1992 2010 −0.475 0.014
USA 1980 2011 0.078 0.010
VNM 1986 2005 −0.111 0.112
ZAF 1980 2010 0.148 0.006
ZMB 1980 2005 −0.491 0.070
ZWE 1980 2005 −0.522 −0.224
23
